Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Nilene Afton Eskelson v. Allen C. Eskelson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
T Quentin Cannon; Cannon and Duffin; Attorneys for Appellant.
Joel M Allred; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Eskelson v. Eskelson, No. 13604.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/778

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF u f AH1975
WKGIAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

Reuben Clark Law School

N I L E N E AFTON ESKELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
13604

vs.
A L L E N C. ESKELSON,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
An appeal from the judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
before the Honorable James E. Sawaya, Judge

T. QUENTIN CANNON, for
CANNON AND DUFFIN
510 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
JOEL M. ALLRED
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

I"
JUL 1 -1974

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.
Clerk,
Supreme CouriTUfah

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
S T A T E M E N T OF N A T U R E OF CASE

1

D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT

1

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The lower court erred in issuing an ex parte
order which attempted to cause decree entered
not to become final at the expiration of three
months from the entry thereof

9

POINT II
The lower court erred in making and entering
an order to set aside orders made and entered by
the court for support, money and alimony

19

POINT III
The lower court erred in making and entering
an order to set aside orders made and entered by
the court for attorney fees

21

P O I N T IV
The lower court erred setting aside a decree of
the court which awarded property (one-half of
I M L stock) to the plaintiff and which was recognized as having been awarded plaintiff without any evidence or consideration of the matter .. 21

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED
Beesley v. Badger, 66 U. 194, 240 P . 458

Page
13

Cole v. Cole, 101 U . 355, 122 P . 2d 210

13

Epps v. Epps, 218 Ala. 667, 120 So. 150

19

In re Harper's Estate 1 U. 2d 296,
265 P . 2d 1005
Myers v. Myers, 62 U. 90, 218 P . 123

10, 22, 23
13

Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1066
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 U ,
574, 144 P . 2d 528
Paul v. Paul, 121 Kan, 88, 245 P .
1022, 46 A L R 1197
Rasmussen v. Call, 55 U. 597, 188 P . 275

19
12, 22

19
10, 11, 22

Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed.
905, 30 S. Ct. 682

19

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, 1943 104-42-5

s
13

Utah Code Annotated, 1943 104-37-2

13

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 30-3-7

9

Laws of Utah 1969, Section 30-3-7

9

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
N I L E N E A F T O N ESKELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs

, 13604
( Case No.

*

A L L E N C. ESKELSON,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF T H E N A T U R E
OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal from the order made and entered
in this action by the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 28th day
of January, 1974, by the Honorable James S. Sawaya,
Judge.
D I S P O S I T I O N IN L O W E R COURT
Appellant filed an Order to Show Cause, p. 187
and an Affidavit, p. 176-186 in support thereof and a
1
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Motion seeking to require respondent to pay alimony,
support money and attorney's fees awarded by the court
to appellant pursuant to hearings had. Judge James S.
Sawaya sitting as a judge of the Third Judicial District
Court, erroneously found that said orders sought to be
enforced "were set aside and the issues merged in the
final decree herein" and as to attorney's fees stated "the
previous orders merged in the final decree".
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Appellant seeks a reversal of said order of the
District Court merging previous orders and decrees for
alimony, support money and attorney's fees made by
the court into the final decree of the court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 1, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint for
divorce, p. 1. On June 27,1972, an Order to Show Cause
issued seeking temporary alimony, support money and
a reasonable attorney's fees. p. 11.
Pursuant to a hearing before Judge Merrill C.
Faux on July 19, 1972, plaintiff was awarded by Order
of court, dated July 20, 1972, $75.00 per month child
support, $500 per month temporary alimony and $100.00 attorney's fees. p. 23. The court on July 28, 1973
ordered that I M L and I M L Driver's Benefit Fund pay
over to plaintiff any and all amounts due and to become
due to defendant until further order of this court, p. 27.
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Before Judge Emmett L. Brown, judge of said
court, the divorce action was heard on August 7, 1972,
p. 36 and the court made and entered on August 9,1972,
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce p. 45 wherein defendant was ordered to pay
plaintiff the sum of $500.00 per month as alimony,
$75.00 per month as child support and the sum of
$300.00 as additional attorney's fees and to be reimbursed for her costs, p. 36. Each of the parties was to
have one-half of the I M L shares, p. 36, 46. There were
540 shares of I M L stock, p. 46.
On November 9, 1972, a Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment p. 55 was filed with the court to set
aside the Decree filed on August 9, 1972 p. 45 together
with an affidavit which alleged that said Decree had
been filed on August 11, 1972, when in truth and in fact
the same had been filed on August 9, 1972 p. 45 and
more than three months had lapsed since the filing of
said decree.
On November 9, 1972, Judge Merrill C. Faux
made and entered an ex parte Order p. 50 reciting the
Default Judgment (actually Decree of Divorce) made
and entered on August 11, 1972, p. 45 (actually August
9, 1972) which provided:
". . . that the effective date of the Decree previously entered in the above matter which was, by
the terms of the Decree, to become final three
months after its entry, is hereby vacated and continued indefinitely, pending further order of this
Court." p. 50.
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On January 16, 1973, there was filed with the
court a Stipulation by and between the respective counsel for the respective parties which provided:
". . . the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered
into in this matter on the 9th day of August,
1972, may become final forthwith as that relates
to the termination of the marital status between
plaintiff and defendant."
" . . . that other than the termination of the marriage relationship between the parties, those
matters brought up in the defendant's Motion
to Set Aside Default Judgment and Decree may
be held in abeyance to be disposed of at the time
defendant's motion is heard."
On January 16, 1973, Judge Marcellus K. Snow
made and entered an Order Terminating the Marriage
Relationship of Parties p. 60 which reads:
" 1 . That the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered into in this matter on August 9, 1972, be
and the same is hereby final at the time of the
signing of this Order as that relates to the marital
relationship between the parties hereto thereby
terminating the marital status between the
parties."
"2. Those matters raised by defendant in his
Motion dated November 9, 1972, relating to alimony, child support and other matters are held
in abeyance and are not final until the time of
the hearing of defendant's Motion and an Order
made in relation thereto." p. 60.
On March 23, 1973 a Notice of Hearing, p. 65,
was mailed to counsel for plaintiff, and said Notice was
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filed with the Court on March 26, 1973, p. 65, calling
up for hearing the "Motion to Set Aside the Default
Judgment heretofore entered in the above entitled
matter." p. 65. Said hearing on said Motion was continued until April 20, 1973, p. 66 at which time said
motion was granted by Judge Marcellus K. Snow. p. 67.
On April 30, 1973, said Order was made and entered
pursuant thereto and plaintiff was "granted the sum of
$75.00 as attorneys fees for services rendered in connection with the hearing on Defendant's Motion, p. 74.
On July 11, 1973, and on July 13, 1973, p. 131, a
trial was held on the above entitled matter and D. Gary
Christian, attorney for plaintiff testified as to his fees
and the matter was taken under advisement.
On July 16, 1973, p. 132, the court made and
entered a Memorandum Decision, which provided, inter
alia: "The $128.00 per month received for the support
of the minor from Social Security is deemed adequate;
because of the defendant's disability and meager income
the plaintiff is awarded only nominal alimony of $1.00
per year; plaintiff is awarded the home and defendant
is awarded an equitable lien on same for $4,000.00; and
plaintiff is awarded $500.00 for attorneys fees, with the
statement that a reasonable fee for plaintiff's attorney
would exceed this amount; however, in light of defendant's present circumstances the Court is of the opinion
that he cannot be subjected to a judgment in excess of
his present ability to satisfy the same. Said memorandum
decision was entered by Judge James S. Sawaya. p. 133.

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On August 27,1973, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce prepared by D.
Gary Christian were signed and filed, p. 135-140. On
August 27, 1973, the Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel
by said D. Gary Christian was filed with the court, p.
141.
On the 17th day of September, 1973, p. 146, defendant made a motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce
and said motion was granted and said Amended Decree
provided, inter aha, "That defendant be and he is hereby
ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of $500.00 for the use
and benefit of her attorney for representation of plaintiff in this matter." The support money for said minor
child was retained at $128.00 per month, which was the
sum which had been paid by the Social Security, p. 146.
On September 17, 1973, defendant filed an Affidavit claiming marriage of plaintiff and obtained an
Order to Show Cause on the 17th day of September,
1973, which was filed November 19, 1973, and ordering
plaintiff to show cause why the $4,000.00 was not due
and owing. On December 6, 1973, a Counter Affidavit
was filed with the court which set forth the facts of the
proceedings in this cause since the beginning. Said
affidavit refers to each exhibit and order and indicates
that defendant was under obligation to pay to plaintiff
the sum of $5,496.00 in alimony and support money
based on the orders o the court, $1,475.00 in attorney's
fees, or a total of $8,993.50, including the $22.50 in
court costs, and the total sum received was $3,478.00,
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leaving a balance due and owing plaintiff by defendant
of $5,515.50 as of December 6, 1973. p. 150.
On December 10, 1973, the court denied the Order
To Show Cause of defendant and ruled that plaintiff
was "under no obligation to pay to defendant said sum
of $4,000.00 mentioned in the decree of divorce herein
at the present time." p. 165.
On December 20,1973, plaintiff obtained an Order
to Show Cause, p. 187, why defendant should not be
found in contempt for having failed to pay the alimony
and support money ordered; why plaintiff should not
have judgment for attorneys fees in the sum of $1,475.00, in accordance with the orders of the court and costs
in the sum of $22.50.
On January 7, 1973, p. 193, a Motion was filed by
plaintiff requesting judgment against defendant in the
sum of $4,542.20 in that there is due and owing the sum
of $500.00 per month alimony for the period of nine
months or $4,500.00; support money for the period of
nine months at $75.00 per month or $675.00; four
months at $128.00 per month or $512.00, and $218.00
per month for 4.5 months or the sum of $576.00, constituting a total of $1,763.00 in support money; attorney's fees in the sums of $100.00, $300.00, $75.00,
$500.00, and $500.00, or a total of $1,475.00, and costs
in the sum of $22.50; and one-half of the I M L stock
having a value of $540.00, or a total of $270.00; constituting a grand total of $8,020.50, and there has been paid
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a total of $3,478.00 thereon, leaving a balance due and
owing of $4,542.20.
On January 18, 1974, the court made and entered
a Memorandum Decision, p. 199, which provided:
1. The support money for said child was reduced
to $100.00 per month.
2. "On the questions of whether plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the I M L stock, the Court
finds that the order was contained in the original
decree which was subsequently set aside and is
of no force and effect, the final decree containing
no provision therefore."
3. "With respect to plaintiff's contention that she
is entitled to a judgment for arrearage of support
money and alimony as contained in prior orders
of the court in this file, the Court finds that these
orders were set aside and the issues merged in the
final decree herein. The Court further finds that
during this period of time the defendant was disabled and unable to financially meet this obligation and for these reasons the Court rules that
plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment for arrearage for alimony and support money."
4. "The Court further finds that on the issue of
attorney fees, the previous orders merged in the
final decree and that plaintiff is entitled to the
award made thereunder of $500.00 together with
$75.00 awarded her on the hearing setting aside
the decree and an additional $75.00 for this hearing, or a total of $650.00 attorney's fees."
From these rulings the plaintiff appeals,

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Section 80-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by Laws of Utah 1969, at all times herein
mentioned provided:
"The decree of divorce shall become absolute at
the expiration of three months from the entry
thereof; unless an appeal or other proceedings
for review are pending, or the court before the
expiration of said period for sufficient cause
otherwise orders. The court, upon application or
on its own motion for good cause shown, shall
have the authority to waive, alter or extend the
period of time before the decree shall become
absolute, but not to exceed six months from the
signing and entry of the decree."
On August 9, 1972, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed in the
above entitled action, p. 36. On November 9, 1972,
counsel for defendant mailed an Affidavit, p. 49 to
counsel for plaintiff. Said Affidavit p. 49 does not set
forth any fact or any grounds as a basis to support said
motion.
On the same day, November 9, 1972, counsel for
defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Notice p. 55 and obtained an exparte Order of
the court:
" . . . that the effective date of the Decree previously entered in the above matter which was,
by the terms of the Decree, to become final three
9
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months after its entry, is hereby vacated and
continued indefinitely, pending further order of
this court."
In the case of Rasmussen v Call, 55 U. 597, 188 p.
275, this court had occasion to examine a interlocutory
decree of divorce which had been set aside by a lower
court without notice to the opposing party. Judge
Gideon speaking for the unanimous court stated, in part:
"The effect of the interlocutory decree being to
vest in plaintiff certain personal and property
rights, it necessarily follows that the existence of
those rights denies to any court the authority or
right to take the same from her, except upon
legal proceedings in which plaintiff, as the interested party, has an opportunity to be heard in
disproof of any attack upon such rights, and to
establish the fact that she is justly entitled to the
rights sought to be taken from her."
"True, in section 3002, supra, proceedings to
review the decree upon the court's own motion
are mentioned, but it was not within the contemplation of the Legislature that sufficient cause
could be determined to exist without an opportunity given to the parties interested to be heard
in defense of any rights granted by the interlocutory decree. "Sufficient cause" means legal
cause. To deprive plaintiff of the rights given
her by the interlocutory decree without notice
and without opportunity to be heard is not due
process of law; in fact, it is without any process."
In Re Harper's Estate, Anderson v. Harper, U.
2d 296, 265 P.2d 1005, this court considered an ex parte
order which set aside a decree of divorce because the
10
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husband had died after the decree was obtained and
before the interlocutory period had expired: Judge
David T. Lewis, speaking for the court stated:
" . . . However, the occurrence of death does not
abate the action itself and to the extent that
property rights are determined by the decree it
remains effective and becomes final in the same
manner and at the same time as one between
living persons."
"At any time before a decree of divorce becomes
absolute, the court may, upon its own motion or
the motion of any person, vacate the decree for
sufficient cause. This statutory power does not
allow the court to vacate a decree without legal
cause nor without giving all persons whose rights
are involved, an opportunity to be heard. In
Rasmussen v. Call, 55 Utah 597,188 P . 275, 276,
this court in considering substantially the same
statutory "provision stated: (then quoted the
opinion excerpt heretofore set forth and went on
to say) :
" . . . However, to the extend the decisions in
those cases indicate approval of ex parte orders
as the basis for vacating divorce decrees affecting
property rights we expressly overrule the holdings."
" . . .The order in the divorce case of June 19,
1950, purporting to vacate the original divorce
decree, is void and was properly attacked by
appellant in the instant proceedings. The judgment of the lower court, being based upon the
void order of the divorce court, is therefore reversed . . . . ."
In the case at bar, the ex parte order vacating and
continuing indefinitely the interlocutory decree is not
11
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only a vacating and continuing of the decree but in
substance and effect suspending the statute. The decree
of the court simply cited the wording of the statute and
the court in an ex parte proceeding was attempting to
circumvent and thwart the provisions of the statute.
The order of the court in the ex parte proceedings
should be declared null and void based on the previous
decisions of this court and the statutes of the State of
Utah.
Based on said rulings of this court, plaintiff is
entitled to an Order declaring the Order made and
entered by the Honorable Merrill C. Faux on the 9th
day of November, 1972, herein declared null and void
and as of no force or effect.
A resolving of this point as presented leaves all
other questions moot.

. POINT II
T H E COURT E R R E D IN MAKING AND ENT E R I N G A N O R D E R TO S E T A S I D E O R D E R S
MADE AND E N T E R E D BY T H E COURT
R E L A T I V E TO A L I M O N Y A N D S U P P O R T
MONEY W H I C H HAD ACCURED.
The landmark case and one which has been followed in many jurisdiction is Openshaw v. Openshaw,
105 U. 574,144 P.2d 528. Justice McDonough speaking
for the unanimous court stated:
12
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" . . . the right of the trial court to modify an
alimony or support money award does not extend
to installments which have already accrued and
which are past due, because the right to collect
such installments becomes vested upon their due
date. Myers v. Myers, 62 U. 90, 218 P . 123, 30
P.L.R. 74; Cole v. Cole, 101 U. 355, 122 P.2d
201. When the right to collect money under the
terms of a decree has vested, it is not within the
province of a court to divest such right, unless
the party who claims the right has acted in such
a manner as to clearly prejudice the substantial
rights of the party against whom the right is
sought to be enforced. 104-42-5 UCA 1943, provides : 'Whenever an order for the payment of a
sum of money is made by a court or judge thereof, pursuant to the provisions of this code, it may
be enforced by execution in the same manner as
if it were a judgment' "
"In Beesly v. Badger, 66 U. 194, 240 P . 458, we
stated that a decree for the payment of alimony
operates as a judgment lien as to all past due and
unpaid installments. Execution therefore may
issue for the arrearages accumulated within a
period of eight years. It is proper for the party
to apply to the court to have the amount of the
unpaid installments ascertained, since the statute
relating to writs of execution require that such
writs specify the amount actually due and owing.
104-37-2, U.C.A. 1943. The plaintiff, therefore,
properly applied to the court for determination
of the precise amount due and owing for which
execution should issue; and absent any competent
facts to establish release, satisfaction, offsets,
estoppel, or other bases for reduction the amount
for which execution should issue, plaintiff was
entitled to an order showing that $7,717.42 was
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the aggregate amount in arrears within a period
of 8 years for which execution should issue."
In the instant case the order for temporary alimony
and support money and the decree of divorce were for
the same amount, i. e. $500.00 per month alimony and
$75.00 per month child support. The order for temporary alimony and support money was dated July 25,
1972, and the decree of divorce was dated August 9,
1972. The hearing date on the order to show cause of
the plaintiff to determine the sum due and owing was
January 17, 1974, or a total of 17 months and 23 days.
17 X 500 equals $8,500.00 and 23/30ths of 500 is
$383.00 or a total of $8,883.00 alimony accrued. 17 X
75 equals $1,275.00 and 23/30ths of 75 is $57.50 or a
total of $1,332.50 accrued child support. This constitutes a total of $10,215.50. The total payments made as
setforth in the affidavit which was neither contradicted
or challenged was $3,478.00 p. 183.
The amount accrued, due and owing as alimony and
child support at the time of said hearing on January
17, 1974, was $10,215.50 less the payment of $3,478.00
or $6,737.50 accrued alimony and support money as of
January 17,1974, p. 201, the date of the hearing on the
order to show cause when plaintiff was seeking judgment for the arrearage.
In the event the court should find that said decree
of divorce was suspended by the order p. 50 of Judge
Merrill C. Faux on November 9, 1972, then the orders
of the court which came into effect for alimony and
support money accrued would be as follows:
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The order fixing temporary alimony and support
money of July 20, 1972, p. 33 provided for said $500.00
per month alimony and $75.00 per month support
money; the decree of divorce under date of August 9,
1972, p. 45 provided for like sums.
In the Findings of Fact p. 39 and 41, it was found
that defendant was earning $16,576.00 per year for
1970 and in excess of $1,100.00 per month p. 39 for the
first six months of 1972, and that plaintiff was a preschool teacher earning $175.00 per month, p. 39. In the
ex parte Order of Judge Faux on November 9, 1972,
p. 50 it provided:
"the effectice of the Decree previously entered
in the above matter which was, by the terms of
the Decree, to become final three months after
its entry, is hereby vacated and continued indefinitely, pending further order of the court."
p. 50.
On January 16, 1973, Judge Marcellus K. Snow
made and entered an Order, p. 60 (after the decree had
become final under the previous decisions of this court)
terminating the marital relationship and as to alimony
and support money stated:
"Those matters raised by defendant in his Motion
dated November 9, 1972, relating to alimony,
child support and other matters are held in
abeyance and are not final until the time of the
hearing on the defendants Motion and an Order
made in relationship thereto." p. 60.
On April 20, 1973, Judge Snow made and entered
a minute entry p. 67 (after the decree had become final
15
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under the previous decisions of this court and the six
months provided by law which provided:
"Defendant's motion to set aside Decree as to
alimony and support is granted." The Order p. 74 by
Judge Snow pursuant to said minute entry was filed
April 30,1973, and provided:
"IT IS H E R E B Y ORDERED, ADJ U D G E D A N D D E C R E E D that the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
is granted and that the Defendant shall be entitled to answer each of the allegations of the
original Complaint with the exception of those
provisions pertaining to the dissolution of "marriage of the parties,. . ." p. 74.
That is the first order made and entered by the
court changing or pertaining to alimony and support
money. From said order for temporary alimony and
support money of July 25, 1972, p. 33 and decree of
divorce of August 9, 1972, p. 45 until said minute
entry of April 25, 1973, p. 67 of Order on April 30,
1973 p. 74, nine months of alimony and support money.
9 X 500.00 is $4,500.00 and 9 X 75.00 is $325.00 or a
total of $4,825.00 in alimony and support money had
accrued. It should be noted that in said minute entry
p. 67 and said order p. 74 by Judge Snow made no provision as to alimony and support money and the setting
aside of the decree did not set aside the Order for
temporary alimony and support money of July 25,
1972, p. 33 and by the setting aside of said decree it
would automatically reinstate the temporary alimony
16
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and support money, namely the $500.00 per month temporary alimony and $75.00 per month temporary child
support. The next order or decree of the court affecting
alimony and support money was August 27,1973, p. 138
at which time the alimony was changed to $1.00 per
annum and the child support as noted in the Memorandum Decision of July 16,1973, p. 132 and the Amended
Decree of Divorce of September 18, 1973, p. 146 in
each of which the child support was fixed at $128.00
per month the amount which Social Security was paying
for the support of said child. It is therefore contended
that even though the Order of April 30, 1973, p. 74 set
aside the alimony and support money allotments that
the order fixing temporary alimony and support money
was not set aside by said order and were in fact reinstated. Alimony and support money had to be provided
and the setting aside of the decree would of necessity
reinstate the temporary alimony and support money.
Based thereon from July 25, 1972, the date of the order
fixing temporary alimony and support money p. 30
until the time of the entry of the decree p. 138 was 13
months at $500.00 per month is $6,500.00. The child
support for said 13 months was 13 X 75 is $975.00, or
a total of $7,475.00 against which there were payments
of $3,478.00 or $3,988.00 in accrued alimony and support money.
On September 18, 1973, the decree p. 146 was
amended to include child support and it was fixed at
$128.00 per month and the alimony was retained at one
dollar per annum.
17
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On January 28, 1974, the court made and entered
the Order p. 202 from which this appeal is taken. Said
Order provides:
"2. Defendant shall pay Plaintiff, monthly, for
the support and maintenance of the minor child,
a sum equal to the difference between what the
Plaintiff receives from Social Security and
$100.00
"4. The Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment
for any arrerage of support money or alimony
alleged in the Affidavits in support of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause to have been provided
for in prior Orders of this Court. The Court
expressly finds that such Orders were set aside
and that the issues considered and raised in such
Orders were subsehuently considered and
merged into the final Decree. The Court further
finds that the Defendant was, during the period
that the arrearage for child support and alimony
is alleged, disable and unable to financially meet
such obligations. For these reasons the Court
rules that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment for an arrearage for either alimony or
support." p. 202.
As to child support, between the entry of the
Amended Decree p. 146 on September 18, 1973, and
the Order, January 28, 1974, p. 202 from which this
appeal was taken was a period of four months and ten
days at $128.00 per month is $512.00 for four months
and one-third of a month or ten days is $42.66 or total
of $554.66. Credit having been previously given for
all payments made, this total was accrued child support
at the time of the Order from which this appeal is taken.
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It has been held by the Supreme Court of Alabama
that the inherent power to modify a decree does not permit a retrospective modification which will cancel arrears of alimony. Epps. v. Epps (1929) 218 Ala. 667,
120 So. 150, of like effect is Sistare v. Sistare (1910)
218 U. S. 1, 54 L. Ed. 905, 30 S. Ct. 682. In Nelson
v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1066, the Supreme
Court of Missouri stated that the courts will make no
modification of the right to accrued installments. The
wife has a vested right to them enforceable in other
states on the basis of full faith and credit. Paul v. Paul,
121 Kan. 88, 245, P. 1022, 46 A L R 1197.
California courts have held that even though the
California rule might differ (automatic release of alimony upon marriage) that the California courts will
give full faith and credit to the Missouri courts where
there is not the automatic release upon a child reaching
majority.
To permit what was attempted in the instant case
would mean that alimony and support payments accrued or in the future might be attacked each and every
time that the case is before the court. There would be no
end to the litigation.
POINT III
T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D IN MAKING
A N D E N T E R I N G A N O R D E R TO S E T A S I D E
ORDER MADE AND E N T E R E D BY T H E
COURT FOR A T T O R N E Y F E E S .
19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the subject action the court made and entered
orders as to attorney's fees as follows:
July 19, 1972
August 9, 1972

April 30,1973
August 27, 1973

September 18,1973

On Order to Show Cause
p. 33
Decree of Divorce (additional attorney's fees)
p. 45
Order on Motion of
Defendant p. 74
Decree of Divorce p. 138
Inadequate according
to Court p. 133
Amended Decree of
Divorce p. 146
Total

$100.00

300.00
75.00

500.00
500.00

$1,475.00

The amount paid by plaintiff pursuant to said
orders and decrees of court is not of record. Counsel in
the practice of law do not charge less than the sums
awarded by the court and clients feel the obligation to
pay the same and await reimbursement from the opposing party. In the instant case, the $500.00 awarded on
September 18, 1973, could certainly be reasonably construed as the same fee awarded in the Decree of Divorce
of August 27,1973. It is entered only to show that "all"
fees awarded by prior or decree are entered.
After parties have been awarded attorney's fees
which have the effect of judgments, certainly the court,
without the presents of counsel or hearing thereon,
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cannot eliminate the fees previously awarded. In the
instant case, D. Gary Christian had withdrawn as counsel p. 141 with the fees he was to receive determined.
How can a court, without counsel being present, wash
out the fees previously awarded based on the services
performed? Under no stretch of the imagination can
said attorney fees be for less than $975.00 for the fees
awarded while counsel was active in the case. Counsel
fees are in the same class as accrued alimony and support
money. They are judgments which may be enforced.
Counsel for the plaintiff has had the obligation of
taking this matter to this court and the matter should
be returned for the fixing of the attorney's fees on this
appeal.
P O I N T IV
T H E COURT E R R E D IN S E T T I N G A S I D E
A D E C R E E O F T H E COURT
WHICH
AWARDED P R O P E R T Y (ONE-HALF OF
I M L STOCK) TO T H E P L A I N T I F F A N D
W H I C H W A S R E C O G N I Z E D AS H A V I N G
BEEN AWARDED PLAINTIFF WITHOUT
A N Y E V I D E N C E OR C O N S I D E R A T I O N O F
T H E MATTER.
In the Decree of Divorce of August 9, 1972, p. 45
the court stated:
"8. That the 540 approximate shares owned by
the parties in the I M L Credit Union are divided
equally between the parties;
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In no other place in the proceedings was this matter
considered yet the court in its order of January 25,
1974, stated:
"3. On the question of whether plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the I M L stock, the Court
finds that the order was contained in the original
decree which was subsequently set aside and is of
no force of effect, the final decree containing no
provision therefore." p. 203.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that property
awarded in a decree cannot be taken without due process of law pursuant to a hearing after notice. In re
Harper's Estate, Anderson v. Harper, 1 U 2d 296, 265
P.2d 1005.

CONCLUSIONS
Point I. The E x Parte Order of Judge Merrill
C. Faux of November 9, 1972, was null and void because no notice was given, no hearing was had and the
order materially deprived the plaintiff of material rights
without due process of law. Rasmussen v. Call, 55 U.
597,188 P . 275. In re Harper's Estate 1 U 2d 296, 265
P.2dl005.
Point I I . Alimony and support money orders are
final orders and alimony and support money accrued
under the same are entitled to full faith and credit in
sister states and cannot be set aside. Openshaw v. Openshaw 105 U. 574, 144 P.2d 528.
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Point I I I . Attorney fees awarded are final orders
which are appealable and when the time for appeal has
run the same cannot be changed or altered.
Point IV. The award of one-half the stock in the
I M L Credit Union in the sum of $270.00 was a property award and final and not subject to change or
alteration. In re Harper Estate, 1 U. 2d 296, 265 P.2d
1005.
Respectfully submitted,
CANNON A N D D U F F I N
By T. Quentin Cannon
510 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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